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Previous research has suggested that logical competence may not always be
reflected in task performances but is influenced by various moderator variables
that affect the actual application of competence. The present research examines
the development of conditional reasoning from the perspective of a competence-
moderator-performance approach (Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman, 1982).
The effects of task interpretation and cognitive style as moderator variables for
conditional reasoning were examined with 8th, 10th, and 12th grade students.
Half of the students at each grade received training with contradictory evidence
to alert them to faulty task interpretations. Generalization of training was assessed
with a second conditional reasoning task. Cognitive style was assessed with the
Matching Familiar Figures test. Results indicate that only the 12th graders benefit
from training and training generalized to the subsequent task. It was also found
that a reflective style enhanced performance at each grade level for the initial
task. However, the beneficial effects of a reflective style were restricted on the
generalization task to 12th graders who had received contradiction training.
Conditional reasoning has been a central
concern of recent research on logical thought
(e.g., Braine, 1978; Cohen, 1981; Cox &
Griggs, 1982; Kuhn, 1977; O'Brien & Over-
ton, 1980, 1982; Rurnain, Connell, & Braine,
1983). This focus is warranted, for the con-
ditional, that is, "if p, then q" is the central
logical connective (Braine, 1978) and is the
logical connective of scientific hypotheses (See
O'Brien & Overton, 1980, 1982; Wason &
Johnson-Laird, 1972).
Investigations of the development and ap-
plication of conditional reasoning require a
clear distinction between an underlying formal
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logical competence that subjects may or may
not possess and other more peripheral mod-
erator factors that serve to (a) yield both false
positive and false negative judgments of the
psychological reality of competence and (b)
operate to influence the actual use of com-
petence once it is acquired (Overton, 1985;
Overton & Newman, 1982). Failure to make
this distinction can lead to anomalous findings
suggesting that young children reason accord-
ing to the rules of logic (e.g., Hawkins, Pea,
Glick, & Scanner, 1984; Rumain et al. 1983)
and young adults do not (e.g., Griggs, 1983;
Wason, 1983).
The present investigation focuses on the
acquisition of propositional logical compe-
tence. This competence is modeled in a
Piagetian framework by the structures of the
formal operational level of reasoning (Beth
& Piaget, 1966; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
Within Piagetian theory the development of
reasoning is characterized as a succession of
increasingly powerful logical systems or com-
petencies. Thus, sensorimotor intelligence
constitutes a system of logic, that is, a com-
petence, but it is a logic of action; preopera-
tional intelligence forms the transition from
the logic of action to a logic of classes and
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relations that constitute concrete operational
intelligence; and the logic of classes and re-
lations ultimately yields to and becomes in-
tegrated with propositional logic, which con-
stitutes the competence of formal operational
intelligence.
From this perspective, successful solutions
to problems involving "if, then" statements
may occur prior to the formal operational
level to the extent that task material and
performance criteria permit class logic solu-
tions (Kuhn, 1977), or to the extent that the
problems permit solutions based on the in-
terpretation of "if, then" statements as a
promise or as a causal relationship (Geis &
Zwicky, 1971). However, a formal under-
standing of the conditional as a propositional
relationship requires the coordinated trans-
formations of formal operational structures.
It is these structures that allow the individual
to reason systematically with logical relation-
ships within a complete propositional system.
Thus, given the conditional "if p then q,"
reasoning at the formal operational level in-
volves recognition that "p and not q" is the
inverse or negation of the conditional; "if q,
then p" is the reciprocal; and "not p and q"
is the inverse of the reciprocal. This recog-
nition is necessary, both to distinguish the
conditional from other logical forms (e.g., the
biconditional, "p if and only if q"), and to
systematically understand the conditions un-
der which the conditional can be tested for
its truth or falsity.
As suggested earlier, investigations of the
acquisition of propositional logical compe-
tence must also be concerned with more
peripheral factors that operate as moderators
of competence. According to this competence-
moderator-performance model (Overton, 1985;
Overton & Newman, 1982), any cognitive
test performance is a function of both the
individual's level of logical competence and
various moderator variables that influence
the application of competence to actual prob-
lems. Moderator variables may include both
organismic factors (e.g., motivation, memory,
attention) and situational factors (e.g., task
structure and demands, contextual factors).
As applied to the assessment of formal con-
ditional reasoning, one particularly important
moderator variable is task interpretation.
When presented with "if, then" statements
and asked to draw appropriate inferences,
subjects are under no necessary obligation to
interpret the task demands according to a
formal conditional interpretation. If subjects
do, in fact, produce varied interpretations of
"if, then" statements, then depending on the
response criteria employed in an investigation,
findings may lead to the conclusion that
children at very young ages understand the
conditional (e.g., admitting causal and other
interpretations of "if, then" and scoring such
interpretations as acceptable) or that individ-
uals, regardless of age, do not understand the
conditional (i.e., admitting various interpre-
tations but maintaining strict formal condi-
tional scoring).
In a series of studies O'Brien and Overton
(1980, 1982) have shown that when special
procedures are introduced to correct for faulty
causal or biconditional interpretations, the
competence necessary for formal conditional
reasoning appears by the 12th grade and is
sustained into the late adult years (Overton,
Franco, & O'Brien, 1984). The general pro-
cedures, referred to as contradiction training,
present subjects with an inference task con-
taining an incomplete conditional rule, that
is, "If a worker is years of age, or older,
then that person will receive at least $350
each week." This is followed by a series of
exemplars, such as a 20-year-old who makes
$50 each week, a 60-year-old who makes
$600 each week, and so forth. Following each
exemplar the subject is required to decide
what, if anything, can be inferred about the
missing age in the rule. During early trials
there is a tendency to interpret the rule as a
causal, biconditional, or some other noncon-
ditional form. However, after several trials,
subjects are presented with an exemplar that
directly contradicts earlier faulty inferences.
For subjects who have acquired the compe-
tence required for conditional reasoning, this
contradiction has the effect of alerting them
to the possibility of the inverse of the recip-
rocal of the conditional, that is, "not p and
q," a recognition that is necessary for formal
conditional reasoning in that it differentiates
causal or biconditional forms from the con-
ditional. As a consequence, subjects who have
acquired requisite competences respond ap-
propriately on later test trials, and this effect
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tasks. For subjects who have not acquired the
requisite competence, the introduction of the
contradiction is irrelevant to their behavior
because they do not have the formal condi-
tional interpretation as an accessible under-
standing of "if, then" statements.
One purpose of the present study then is
to further explore the development of the
requisite competence for conditional reason-
ing in the context of the manner in which
task interpretation influences the application
of this competence. Task interpretation is
primarily determined by the situational de-
mands and structure of the problem. A second
purpose of this study is to examine a more
organismically relevant moderator variable,
that is, attention, as it is assessed by cognitive
style.
There are several reasons to suspect that
cognitive style may serve as a moderator of
logical competence. Given the developmental
trend in the ability to distinguish between
conditional and other "if, then" interpreta-
tions found by O'Brien and Overton (1980,
1982), it may be that highly successful per-
formance on conditional reasoning problems
requires a slower, more systematic approach
to the task. Brodzinsky (1982) found that
performances on concrete operational tasks
were better for children who were found to
be reflective rather than impulsive on the
Matching Familiar Figures (MFF) test; style
was also found to predict well to performances
1 year later. O'Brien and Overton reported
that competent adult subjects who were tested
on conditional syllogism tasks following earlier
contradiction training make different ratings
of problem difficulty than did subjects who
did not have the requisite competence. This
difference in rating demonstrates an awareness
of the need for care and effort. Furthermore,
the experimenters who tested the subjects in
these earlier studies noted informally that
among competent subjects those who did not
give rapid responses seemed more likely to
benefit from training. It is of interest then,
to examine whether cognitive style moderates
performance on conditional reasoning tasks
and whether style mediates the effectiveness
of contradiction training.
It should be noted that several criticisms
have been raised concerning the use of
the MFF as an index of style. Block, Block,
and Harrington (1974) argued that there is
a discrepancy between the conceptual defini-
tion of the reflectivity-impulsivity dimension
which emphasizes latency, and its frequent
aperationalization which includes error scores.
Moreover, they contend that either an accu-
rate-inaccurate categorization scheme or the
notion of ego resiliency are more appropriate
for describing data from a number of studies.
Finally, they question the validity of employ-
ing a task that ostensibly taps the tendency
to withhold response on problems that con-
tain response uncertainty (Kagan & Messer,
1975) to generalize to the broader, commonly
held definitions of "Reflective" and "Impul-
sive'* personalities. Others argue that the usual
double-median split of latency and error
scores used to categorize subjects results in
low test-retest reliability, loss in statistical
power for correlations, and the disregarding
of a fair percentage of subjects who don't
meet the criteria for Slow/Accurate (i.e., "re-
flective") and Fast/Inaccurate (i.e., "impul-
sive") categories (Ault, Mitchell, & Hartmann,
1976; Egeland & Weinberg, 1976). In the
present study, however, the MFF is used as
an index of preferred approach to tasks that
vary in degree of uncertainty and as an index
of attention to detail. It is not the intent of
this study to make broad personality attri-
butions to subjects. Attention to detail is
viewed as a potential moderator of conditional
reasoning competence. Furthermore, the
problems of double-median splits is remedied
by converting MFF scores into composite
standard scores. This conversion improves
reliability, increases statistical power, and also
includes all subjects in analyses (Egeland &
Weinberg, 1976; Salkind & Wright, 1977).
The present study, then, investigated both
the situational moderator factor of task inter-
pretation and the organismic moderator factor
of cognitive style. It was not expected that
either variable would have a major effect for
individuals who have not yet developed the
necessary competence. O'Brien and Overton
(1980, 1982) found that successful conditional
reasoning could be elicited from the 12th
graders but not from the 8th graders or
younger subjects. In the present study, a 10th-
grade group was added in order to assess the
developmental trend. Although it was ex-
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benefit the 12th graders but not the 8th
graders, no specific prediction was made about
the 10th grade performances.
With respect to cognitive style, it was ex-
pected that although a slower, systematic (i.e.,
"reflective") approach might enhance perfor-
mance across grade levels, specific additional
benefits should be derived from taking a
reflective approach once logical competence
was acquired. Furthermore, because correct
task interpretation is a necessary precondition
for successful conditional reasoning, it was
expected that the additional beneficial effects
of a reflective approach should be limited to
the older groups that received contradiction
training.
Method
Subjects
Thirty-six eighth graders (M = 13 years, 10 months,
SD = 4.05 months), thirty-six I Oth graders (M = 15 years,
9 months, SD = 3.51 months), and thirty-six 12th
graders {M = 17 years, 10 months, SD = 3.63 months)
participated. All were male and enrolled in middle-class
parochial grade schools or high schools in suburban
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Tasks and Design
Each subject was given an inference task, which presents
the rule: "If a worker is years of age, or older,
then that person will receive at least $350 each week."
Each of 12 trials presents the age and salary for a single
exemplar (see Table 1). The task was to decide, for each
trial, which of three response choices could be inferred
from the exemplar about the missing age in the rule. For
example, following the exemplar of a 25-year-old who
makes $200 each week, it would be correct to decide
that the age in the rule is more than 25 (Choice 1),
whereas it would be incorrect to infer that the age in the
rule is 25 at most (Choice 2) or nothing at all (Choice
3). Although subjects tend to respond to exemplars in
which the monetary amount is less than that stated in
the rule with the correct choice (Choice I), there is a
tendency for subjects to respond incorrectly to exemplars
in which the amount is greater than that stated in the
rule with Choice 2. The correct response is Choice 3,
that is, that nothing at all can be inferred. Under
interpretations of "if, then" statements other than the
conditional, it is usual not to recognize that someone
could make more than $350 without exceeding the age
in the exemplar. Inspection of Table 1 shows that all ages
below 45 are associated with salaries less than $350,
whereas all ages above 45 are associated with salaries
above $350 (except for Trial 6). For half of the subjects
at each age, Trial 6 provides a contradictory exemplar
for the erroneous inferences, whereas the other subjects
received no such information. This contradiction between
expectation and evidence allows the subject to realize the
possibility of "not-p and q," a realization necessary for
correct conditional reasoning. Thus there were two treat-
ment groups. Additional details of the inference task are
presented in O'Brien and Overton (1980).
Following the inference task, each subject was given
an evaluation task designed to assess generalization of
the treatment effects. The evaluation task used the follow-
ing six conditional statements: (a) "If a worker is 70 years
of age, or older, then that person must be retired;" (b)
"If a rod is thin, then it must be flexible;" (c) "If you
get a flu shot, then you won't get the flu;" (d) "If a card
has a letter A on one side of it, then it has a number 3
on the other side of it;" (e) "If rilks are tall, then spritzers
have teeth;" and (f) "If a student does the homework,
then the student will get a good grade." The first statement
was always given first, and the order of presentation of
the other five statements was counterbalanced. Following
the presentation of the conditional statements, the subject
was presented with the four pairs of prepositional ex-
emplars, that is, "p and q" "not-p and q" "p and not-
q" and "not-p and not-?," in random order. The task
was to decide for each of the propositional exemplars
whether or not it provides proof of the truth or falsity of
the conditional statement. For example, the statement
"If a rod is thin, then it must be flexible" requires the
assessment that the exemplar "a rod that is thin and not
flexible" (/? and not-#) provides such proof, whereas the
other exemplars do not.
Table 1
Age and Salary Instances in the Inference Task
Rule: "If a worker is years of age, or older, then
that person will receive at least $350 each week."
Age Amount Conditional Biconditional
15
70
20
25
65
60*
65*
30
55
50
35
45
40
100
400
50
200
550
600*
200*
300
450
350
250
500
150
a
c
a
a
, c
c
a
a
c
c
a
c
a
a
b
a
a
b
b
a
a
b
b
a
b
a
Note. The Conditional column shows the response that
would be made with a conditional interpretation of the
rule.
The Biconditional column shows the response that would
be made with a biconditional interpretation of the rule.
Task taken from O'Brien and Overton, 1982.
" "The age in the rule is more than . . ."
* "The age in the rule is . . .at most."
c "Nothing at all."
d Trial 6 without contradictory evidence.
e Trial 6 with contradictory evidence.696 W. OVERTON, J. P. BYRNES, AND D. P. O'BRIEN
Following the evaluation task, each subject was given
the elementary form of the MFF test. Here cognitive
style, that is, "impulsivity/reflectivity," is indexed by the
subject's speed and errors in choosing from six figures
the one which exactly matches the exemplar figure {See
Messer, 1976). This task was considered to assess each
subject's attention to detail under conditions of response
uncertainty. It was chosen to operationalize cognitive
style since each subject would receive a score reflecting
average response latency and total number of errors with
respect to the individual's age group. Although there are
alternate forms of the MFF, the elementary form was
considered appropriate because it yielded reasonable
variability at each grade level: latency standard devia-
tions—11,96 (12th), 7.07 (10th), 7.35 (8th); error standard
deviations—2.31 (12th), 2.92 (10th), 2.66 (8th).
Procedure
All subjects were given the inference task, the evaluation
task, and the MFF in that order. The inference and
evaluation tasks were administered to groups of four
subjects of a given grade per session. The MFF was
administered individually within 1 week of the first
testing session.
During the first session, subjects were given the inference
task booklet containing instructions on the cover, and a
single trial on each succeeding page. Each page presented
the information for that trial and the information from
each preceding trial. The subjects read the written in-
structions as the tester read them aloud. The instructions
state
There is a business that has a rule about the amount
of money it pays people each week. What we know is
that IF SOMEONE IS YEARS OF AGE, OR OLDER,
THEN THAT PERSON WILL RECEIVE AT LEAST $350 EACH
WEEK. We want to know what can be said about the
missing age in the rule. I'm going to show you the age
and amount of money that different workers make.
After I tell you the age and amount of money that a
worker makes, you tell me, on the basis of this
information, what you can about the age in the rule.
Do you understand?"
The tester then asked the subjects to turn to the first trial
and to respond to it. Whether or not the subject was
correct, the tester explained the reasoning behind the
correct solution, that is, because the monetary amount
in the exemplar is less than that in the rule, the age in
the rule must be more than that in the exemplar. Trial
I was used as an. example.
Each page in the booklet provided the rule with the
missing age, a list of all previous exemplars (to control
for memory), a new exemplar, and the three response
choices: (a) the age in the rule is more than that in the
given exemplar, (b) the age in the rule is that given in
the exemplar at most; and (c) nothing at all can be said
about the missing age in the rule. Subjects were told that
the responses for a trial were to be made with respect to
the age and salary of the exemplar for that trial. They
were also shown all previous exemplars to allow them to
see how the ages and salaries were related up to a given
trial. The tester read aloud all information for the first
four trials, then told the group to work at their own
pace.
Within the first session, subjects were given the evalu-
ation task following the completion of the inference task.
The instructions on the cover of the test booklet were
read aloud for the subjects. They were told that unlike
the first task where every page had the same rule, each
page of the evaluation task had its own rule. Then
subjects were informed that under each propositional
exemplar were slots labeled "yes" and "no." If they
thought that the exemplar proved the rule either true or
false they were to mark the "yes" response. If they
thought that the exemplar proved neither truth nor
falsity, they were to mark the "no" response.
During the second testing session each subject received
the MFF test Response times to the first choice of a
trial, and the number of errors per trial were noted.
When the subject made an incorrect choice, the subject
was told to respond again.
Scoring
Inference task. Conditional and other interpretations
of the "if, then" rule lead to different responses on Trials
8, 9, and 11, the relevant trials following the training
Trial 6 (see O'Brien & Overton, 1980, for additional
details). Responses were scored by giving 1 point for each
response that was consistent with a formal conditional
interpretation, that is, that the information tells nothing
at all about the missing age in the rule. There was thus
a maximum of 3 points per subject.
Evaluation task. One point was given for each "yes"
response for the "p and not-#" exemplar type, and one
point for each "no" response for each of the other three
exemplar types. There was thus a maximum score of 4
points for each of the propositional exemplars summed
across the six statements, for a total of 24 points.
MFF Response time to the first choice of a test item
was measured with a stop watch. The number of errors
each subject committed was summed across 12 trials. In
order to yield a single score that incorporated each
person's response time and errors with respect to the
group performance of the person's grade level, the follow-
ing / score conversions were computed. First, the total
number of errors per subject was converted into a
standard score using the standard deviation information
from only the subject's grade level. Second, the same
conversion was conducted on each subject's average re-
sponse latency. Next, the latency standard score was
subtracted from the error standard score. Subjects with
net positive / scores were categorized "impulsive," because
this summary score indicated generally more errors and
shorter latencies with respect to subject's grade perfor-
mance. Subjects with negative net / scores were deemed
"reflective" because this summary score indicted generally
longer latencies and fewer errors (See Salkind & Wright,
1977).
Results
Inference Task
To assess the effect of introducing the
contradiction training, a 3 (grade) X 2 (treat-CONDITIONAL REASONING 697
Table 2
Mean Number of Correct Response on Conditional Reasoning Tasks
Group
Contradictory
Reflective
Impulsive
Noncontradictory
Reflective
Impulsive
Contradictory
Reflective
Impulsive
Noncontradictory
Reflective
Impulsive
8th grade
Inference task
0.71 (7)
0.64(11)
1.11 (9)
0.56 (9)
Evaluation task
9.29 (7)
11.27(11)
13.11 (9)
10.56 (9)
10th grade
1.44 (9)
0.89 (9)
1.00(8)
0.38 (10)
12.22 (9)
9.78 (9)
13.60 (8)
11.50(10)
12th grade
2.15(11)
1.60(9)
1.29(8)
1.00 (8)
16.31 (11)
11.80(9)
11.86(8)
11.73(8)
Note. Maximum score inference task = 3.0; maximum score evaluation task - 24.0; Numbers in parentheses = N
per grade — training — style subgroup.
ment) X 2 (cognitive style) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was computed for the inference task
scores using the regression approach to un-
equal cell sizes. Unequal cell sizes occurred
because cognitive style was assessed after the
two conditional reasoning tasks had been
administered. Means for the inference task
are presented in Table 2. There was a signif-
icant main effect for grade, F{2, 96) = 6.41,
p < .002. Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses
at the .05 level of significance revealed that
whereas the 12th graders performed signifi-
cantly better than either the 8th or 10th grade
subjects, there was no difference between the
8th and 10th graders. The main effect for
Training and the Grade X Training interaction
were not significant.
Based on the results of O'Brien and Over-
ton (1980, 1982), planned comparisons were
computed for the Grade X Training interac-
tion. The a priori hypothesis was that the
12th graders would benefit from the intro-
duction of the contradictory evidence. The
analysis confirmed that the 12th graders who
received the contradiction training performed
better than the 12th graders who did not
receive such training, t{34) = 2.76, p < .05,
whereas there were no significant differences
between training and control groups at either
the 8th or 10th grades. These findings support
the theoretical expectation that the prereq-
uisite cognitive structures necessary to benefit
from task training are available by the 12th
grade; however, the introduction of the con-
tradiction training was not an effective factor
for the 8th or 10th graders.
The ANOVA also demonstrated a significant
main effect for cognitive style, F(l, 96) =
8.60, p < .004. Subjects found to be "reflec-
tive" on the MFF performed significantly
better than did those found to be "impulsive."
Cognitive stye interacted neither with grade
nor with training, nor was the Grade X
Training X Cognitive Style interaction signif-
icant. The correlation between error and la-
tency raw scores was —.625, p < .01. When
age is partialed out of this correlation, it
becomes -.545, p < .01. The overall corre-
lation between inference scores and MFF
standard scores was -.27, p < .002. When
subjects were grouped by grade and treatment,
only the 12th graders who received the
contradictory evidence generated a signifi-
cant correlation between these scores, -.45,
p < .05.
Evaluation Task
In order to assess the generalizability of
the training effect, a 3 (grade) X 2 (train-
ing) X 2 (cognitive style) X 4 (exemplar type)
ANOVA was computed with repeated measures698 W, OVERTON, J. P. BYRNES, AND D. P. O'BRIEN
for exemplar type. This analysis used the
regression approach to unequal cell sizes.
The means for the evaluation task are pre-
sented in Table 2.
The main effects for grade and training
were not significant. Based on the findings of
O'Brien and Overton (1980, 1982), a signifi-
cant effect for the Grade X Training interac-
tion was expected, and planned comparisons
were computed. The a priori hypothesis was
that the 12th-grade subjects would perform
better on the evaluation task following the
contradiction training. The analysis showed
that this was the case, f(34) = 2.81, p < .05,
whereas there were no significant differences
at either the 8th or 10th grades between the
training and nontraining groups. It should
also be noted that the more conservative
ANOVA revealed a significant Grade X Train-
ing interaction, F(2, 96) - 3.27, p < ,05.
These findings suggest that only the 12th
graders who received contradictory evidence
were alerted to the conditional possibility of
"not p and q," which subsequently enabled
them to adequately test the truth status of
conditional statements. Hence, given these
manipulations, only the 12th graders evidence
the necessary competence.
There was also a significant main effect for
cognitive style, F{\, 96) = 5.57, p < .03. Re-
flective individuals scored significantly higher
than those who were assessed as impulsive in
their style. Furthermore, there was a signifi-
cant Grade X Training X Cognitive Style
interaction, F{2> 96) = 3.44, p < .04. New-
man-Keuls within-grade comparisons of the
Grade X Training X Style interaction at the
.05 level of significance reveal that the major
contribution of cognitive style is at the 12th
grade. Here, reflective individuals in the con-
tradiction training group performed signifi-
cantly better than all other groups. The overall
correlation across grade and treatment be-
tween evaluation scores and MFF standard
scores is -.25, p < .04. It appears that once
individuals have the prerequisite cognitive
structures, a reflective style augments the
expression of competence.
There was no significant main effect for
exemplar type, nor an interaction of Grade X
Exemplar Type, nor Training X Exemplar
Type. However, the Grade X Training X Ex-
emplar Type interaction was significant, F(6,
Table 3
Evaluation Task Means: Grade X Training X
Exemplar Type Interaction
Training-
exemplar
Contradictory
evidence
p-q
p-q
p-q
p-q
No contradictory
evidence
p-q
P-q
p-q
P-Q
8th
0.50
2.83
3.61
3.50
.66
3.94
3.50
3.72
Grade
10th
0.83
3.44
3.61
3.11
.83
4.11
3.72
4.00
12th
0.72
5.39
4.50
4.44
1.16
3.20
4.16
3.22
Note. Maximum score per cell = 6.0.
248) = 3.49, p < .003, and the Grade X
Cognitive Style X Exemplar Type interaction
was significant, F{6, 288) = 2.63, p < .02.
Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses at the .05
level of significance for the Grade X Train-
ing X Exemplar Type interaction revealed that
the 12th graders who received the contradic-
tion training performed significantly better
than either the 8th- or lOth-grade training
groups on the "p and not-#" exemplar type,
and the 12th graders in the contradiction
training groups performed significantly better
than the 8th-grade training group with the
"not-p and not-tf" exemplar type. There were
no significant between-grade comparisons for
the nontraining groups for any of the exem-
plar types. The within-grades comparisons
reveal that significantly more errors were
made with "p and q" exemplar type than
each of the other types, and there were no
differences among the other three types. These
findings suggest that although the 12th graders
committed as many errors of confirmation
as subjects at the other grades, it was only
this group that demonstrated insight into the
structure of the conditional. The Grade X
Training X Exemplar type cell means are
presented in Table 3.
Newman-Keuls comparisons for the
Grade X Cognitive Style X Exemplar Type
interaction reveal that all groups perform
most poorly on the "p and q" type. The only
other significant finding was that 12th-gradeCONDITIONAL REASONING 699
impulsives and lOth-grade impulsives differ
on the "p and not-<?" exemplar type. The cell
means for this interaction are presented in
Table 4.
In order to assess whether these findings
are general across the varied content of the
six statements of the evaluation task, an
additional ANOVA was computed in which
scores are summed across exemplar types
rather than across statements. In this case,
there is a maximum score of four for each
subject for each statement. This is a 3
(grade) X 2 (treatment) X 2 (cognitive
style) X 6 (statement) ANOVA with repeated
measures for statement. Again, the regression
procedure was used for treatment of unequal
cell sizes.
As would be expected from the results of
the ANOVA reported above, there was a sig-
nificant main effect for cognitive style, F(l,
96) = 5.74, p < .02, a significant interaction
of Grade X Treatment, F{2, 96) = 3.71, p <
.03, and a significant interaction of Grade X
Treatment X Style, F(2, 96) = 3.72, p < .03.
There was also a significant main effect for
statement, iH(5, 480) = 9.80, p < .001, and a
significant interaction of Grade X Statement,
F(10, 480) = 2.17, p< .02.
Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons at
the .05 level of significance for the main
effect for content reveal that the statement
"if a worker is 70 years of age, or older, then
that person must be retired" leads to signifi-
cantly better performances than each of the
other statements. O'Brien and Overton (1980)
reported that this statement led to the best
performances among the same set of state-
ments with the selection task procedure. Fur-
thermore, O'Brien and Overton (1980) re-
ported that the statement "if rilks are tall,
then spritzers have teeth" led to the worst
performances on the selection task, and the
present data from the evaluation task show
that this statement led to worse performances
than each of the others.
Newman-Keuls comparisons for the
Grade X Statement interaction reveal that
the superior performances with the statement
concerning retired workers and their ages is
due almost entirely to the 12th-grade group.
Performances with this statement by 12th
graders were significantly better than those of
all other 17 cells. This suggests that the
Table 4
Evaluation Task Means: Grade X Cognitive
Style X Exemplar Type
Style-exemplar
Reflect ives
P-q
p-q
p-q
P'Q
Impulsives
p-q
p-q
p-q
p-q
8th
(16)
.38
3.50
3.87
3.69
(20)
.75
3.30
3.30
3.60
Grade
10th
(19)
.84
4.68
3.53
3.89
(17)
.82
2.76
3.82
3.18
12th
(20)
1.05
4.40
4.85
4.45
(16)
.81
4.19
3.69
3.06
Note. Maximum score per cell = 6.0; Numbers in paren-
theses = A' per grade - style subgroup.
competence of the 12 graders is demonstrated
most readily with the statement that is most
similar to the material of the immediately
preceding inference task, even when the con-
tradiction training had not been provided.
Discussion
The present study investigated the devel-
opment of formal conditional reasoning from
the perspective of a competence-moderator-
performance approach (Overton, 1985; Over-
ton & Newman, 1982). A primary finding of
this study, which is consistent with and ex-
tends the work of O'Brien and Overton (1980,
1982), is that the first evidence of the prereq-
uisite logical competence required for formal
conditional reasoning appears at around the
12th grade. Neither the 8th- or lOth-grade
subjects provided evidence on either the in-
ference task or the evaluation task of insight
into the formal structure of the conditional
relationship. The 12th-grade subjects, on the
other hand, significantly benefited from con-
tradiction training, suggesting they had the
logical competence available to them, and
generalized their insight to a test of the
conditions that test the truth or falsity of the
conditional. It was only the 12th graders who
consistently and accurately took counter ex-
amples, that is, "p and not <7," as falsifying
and the other exemplars as irrelevant to the
truth status of conditionals.
As a cautionary note, it should be stated700 W. OVERTON, 1. P. BYRNES, AND D. P. O'BRIEN
that the foregoing interpretation is not meant
to preclude the possibility that prepositional
logical competence is acquired earlier than
the 12th grade. It may, for example, be the
case that by increasing the saliency of the
contradiction manipulation, competence will
be demonstrated at an earlier age. Further-
more, more converging evidence employing
different tasks is needed. Both of these types
of investigations are currently being conducted
in our laboratory. But for the moment the
evidence across a series of studies is consistent
that the prerequisite competence is available
by the 12th grade, and it is available in a
manner that is readily accessible through a
rather subtle experimental manipulation.
The least logical part of the 12th graders'
performance was the tendency to take con-
firming exemplars, that is, "p and q" as
proof. However, this also replicates previous
reported data (Moshman, 1979; O'Brien &
Overton, 1980, 1982; O'Brien, Costa, &
Overton, 1983). The reasons for the persis-
tence of this error also require further study.
That task interpretation operates as a mod-
erator variable was also demonstrated by the
12th graders' performance. Here the successful
performance of the group receiving the pro-
cedure designed to alert them to fallacious
interpretations of the conditional stands in
contrast to the performance of the group that
was left to its own devices to generate their
own interpretation of the "if, then" state-
ments. It seems clear that although some
subjects who possess the requisite competence
for a formal conditional interpretation will,
in fact, spontaneously generate this interpre-
tation, a fair assessment of the underlying
competence requires the introduction of pro-
cedures to countermand the preference among
others to generate alternative interpretations.
Attention to detail as assessed by the cog-
nitive style variable was also found to operate
as a moderator of competence. For the orig-
inal inference task, a reflective style simply
enhanced performance regardless of the log-
ical competence of the subject, and regardless
of whether the subject received contradiction
training. However, for the generalization task
the benefits of a reflective style were mani-
fested primariy in those individuals who had
the logical competence to perform successfully
and who had received training alerting them
to the appropriate conditional interpretation.
Thus it appears that once the conditions of
competence and correct interpretation are set
a reflective style acts as a moderator variable
in further enhancing performance.
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